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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CREDIT AVAILABILITY AND 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: 
NOTES ON THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE* 
by 
V . Bruce J . Tolentino** 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, the largest international 
aid agencies, working with the governments of many 
developing nations, have pumped funds in excess of U . S . $8 
Billion into specialized lending programs (Von Pischke, 
1 9 8 4 ) . The basic aim of these programs has been to 
*Paper presented during the ACPC-PIDS-OSU sponsored 
"seminar-workshop on "Financial Intermediation in the Rural 
Sector: Research Results and Policy Issued" held on 26-27 
September 1988 at the Cuaderno Hall , Central Bank of the 
Philippines . This is a revised and extended version of a 
presentation at a special session of the "International 
Workshop on Rural Financial Markets" of Ohio State 
University, June 14 , 1988 . The comments and suggestion's 
of Gilberto Llanto and especially of Richard Meyer and 
Solita Collas-Monsod are gratefully acknowledged. 
• •Executive Director , Agricultural Credit Policy 
Council (AC PC) . 
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stimulate growth in specific area's considered as priority 
investment targets - or areas of "greatest need" . At the 
same time, governments also attempted to regulate their 
countries' financial markets, with the objective of 
focussing the lending of their banking systems on those 
preferred areas of investment. 
Two decades of international experience have made it 
clear that these policies and programs have not performed 
as expected. In many cases these programs have instead 
created problems and distortions which now require 
correction before progress can be achieved to resolve the 
initial conditions. These problems include, among 
others, banking sub-systems highly dependent on aid (both 
foreign and domestic), a mentality that equates government 
lending with welfare assistance/ an interest rate 
structure which favors areas of lower, not higher, 
comparative advantage for the developing economies, and, 
s ignif icantly , a highly-developed informal, curb financial 
market which complements and to some extent substitutes 
for the constrained formal financial system (Adams, e_t 
a_l., 1 9 8 4 ) . 
There seems to be l ittle question that the increased 
availability of credit (meaning a larger Supply of loanS) 
leads to faster economic growth. The main problem seems 
to focus on just how the greater availability of credit to 
development projects and enterprises may be stimulated and 
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secured. There continues to be great tension between 
approaches that rely on direct government provision, if 
not fiat and allocation, of loan funds to preferred 
sector^ and purposes (the "targetting" approach) on the 
one hand, and on the other the more recently-popularized 
" f inancial l iberalization" package growing out of the work 
of Shaw and KcKinnon (the "financial markets" approach) 
initially published in 1973. 
THE KEYNESIAN PRESCRIPTION 
The traditional analysis 3/id prescription of the 
process of growth to a large extent grew out of the work 
of John Maynard Keynes ( 1935 ) . The familiar Keynesian 
prescription for growth focusses on keeping interest rates 
low to stimulate investment which in turn produces greater 
output. The Keynesian approach also emphasizes the need 
to dampen the preference for cash holdings, such that the 
holdings of productive assets are maximized (Coats and 
Khatkate, 1 9 8 4 ) . This was echoed by Tobin who extended 
the basic Harrod-Domar growth model to incorporate money, 
showing . that the higher the return to money in a 
household's portfolio of assets, then a smaller proportion 
* 
of wealth is allocated to capital , thus decelerating 
growth (Tobin, 1965 ) . The work of Keynes and Tobin have 
formed the principal theoretical foundation for controlled 
low-interest rate policies . 
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The Keynesian prescription of low interest rates f i t 
well with the appealing, and seemingly common SenSical 
"supply-leading" strategy of financial development 
(Patrick, 1968 ) . In the supply-led strategy, finance is 
provided in advance of effective demand. Thus specialized 
lending institutions and program's were created to 'service 
priority commodities, Sector's, purposes and c l ientele . 
The presence of bankers and banks, it waS argued, would 
help stimulate enterpreneurship and investment. Many 
developing countries adopted this 'strategy and many St i l l 
maintain such programs in spite of growing evidence that 
• 
it has not only failed to effectively and eff iciently 
Stimulate development, but has also introduced 
counterproductive distortions into the financial market's 
of the developing world (Meyer, 1 9 8 8 ) . 
THE DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION 
Financial regimes characterized principally by 
controlled low-interest rate policies have come to be 
described as "repressed" (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1 973 ) . The 
primary feature of financially-repressed economies are 
restrictions on interest rates, which are often 
rationalized not only as stimuli for investment, but also 
as protection of the public against "usury" . Financially-
repressed economies also Suffer high reserve requirements 
imposed, on bank deposits; compulsory credit allocation's 
which reduce incentives for holding claims on the domestic 
banking 'system; the di's tor tionar y provision of subsidized 
loan's; and the costly, yet ineffective , proliferation of 
specialized , government-run lending institutions created 
to cater to "preferred" sectors and borrower's. The 
diStortionary effects of these restrictions are often 
exacerbated by price inflation . The results of repression 
include negative real deposit rates of interest on 
monetary assets — thu's the demand for money, and 
especially the supply by household's of f inancialized 
savings, falls as a proportion of GNP. 
Financialized savings, however, is the primary source 
of investment funds, particularly in developing countries 
where the 'stock and bond markets are small and the capital 
markets thin. Financial repression thus exacerbates the 
fragmentation of the financial market, where: 
a . interest rate's on bank lending vary arbitrarily 
from one group of preferred borrowers to 
another; 
b . the process of self-finance is impairedi The 
accumulation of cash balances in preparation for 
lumpy, discrete investments is made more co'stly; 
and 
c . socially-costly inflation hedges become 
attractive, private1 l iquidity is minimized, and 
financial deepening outside of the formal 
banking system becomes prohibitive. 
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FINANCIAL REPRESSION AND THE INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKET 
An even more important adverse effect of financial 
repression is the reduction of the flow of loanable funds 
through the formal banking system. Thus potential 
investors are forced to either Self-finance or resort to 
the informal, curb market for loans (McKinnon, 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Self-finance can be costly, since before large-scale 
investments are actually made, a process of accumulation 
of the required savings must be completed. Thus 
investment programs require more time than would be 
necessary through an eff iciently functioning credit system 
which arbitrates between the time preference options of 
borrower's and savers. 
It is observed that in financially-repreSSed 
economies the informal financial market is very large and 
active. Detailed evidence on the informal market, like 
the evidence available on the underground economy, iS very 
Sketchy. Fragmentary evidence from the Philippine economy 
and other similar countries, however, indicate that only 
three to four households out of ten in the rural areas 
ever borrow from any Source (Tolentino, 1988a ) . Of those 
who borrow, three-quarters borrow from informal sources. 
The rest either self-finance, or enter into quasi-lending 
arrangements, like contract growing and production 
(Tolentino, 1988b) . 
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The nominal interest rates charged in the informal 
sector are often considered to.be very high. Thik is to 
be expected since default rate's and servicing costs of 
such loans are very high. Moreover, given that a 
significant proportion of lending is done by the informal 
sector, the total volume of bank lending is kept low, 
keeping per unit lending costs in the overall loan market 
high. 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AS A SOLUTION 
Providing "solutions" to the relatively high level of 
interest rates and the constricted availability of loans 
that has often been the rationale for government 
intervention in finance, and the consequent development of 
financial repression. Controls on interest rates and 
quotas on lending to favored clientele have had effects 
opposite to expectations, and have actually exacerbated 
the problems these were intended to solve (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1976 ) . Furthermore, governments which have enacted the 
repressive regulations have found that the task is not as 
straightforward nor as cheap.- for all concerned - as it 
often seems. 
For example, the U . S . government has traditionally 
provided a high level of implicit subsidies to American 
farmers via government guarantees on bonds issued by the 
extensive U . S . Farm Credit System. During the past few 
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years however, the U . S . government has found that it can 
hardly afford to cover the losses resulting from the 
guarantees, which have grown and pyramided over the years. 
Recent events in the system, as well as the symptomatic 
bank failures in Texas and I l l i n o i s , point to the 
fragility of the system dependent on government Support. 
The U . S . government is now scaling down the guarantees and 
relying more on market forces. The European Economic 
Community is also now realizing the enormity of the long-
term burdens that their system of agricultural credit and 
price supports, and initiatives are now being enacted to 
'scale such subsidies down to more affordable , and less 
distortionary, levels . 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
The liberalization of the economy from the 
constraints of repression has come to be accepted as a 
basic part of the agenda for development proposed by 
policy analysts and academician's (McKinnon, 1988 ) . The 
basic prescription for a financially-repressed economy, 
according to the received .wisdom, is the freeing of 
interest rates so that real interest rates are kept 
positive, close to open market levels , and attractive 
enough to draw financialized 'savings into the stream of 
loanable fund's. Mandated allocations of credit to 
favored/preferred sectors must be abolished. Appropriate 
macroeconomic policies , particularly the maintenance of a 
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stable price level and an equilibrium exchange rate , 
complete the environment so that potential investor's can 
judge the true 'scarcity price of capital , and invest 
according to an undistorted set of criteria baSed on the 
productive efficiency of the investment. 
A number of countries which adopted the Shaw-McKinnon 
prescriptions seem to have achieved remarkable success: 
at various times Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have 
maintained highly positive real rates of interest and 
rates of financial growth. Yet other countries which 
incorporated the Shaw-McKinnon solutions in their economic 
liberalization programs ended in near collapse, 
particularly in the Latin American cases of Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay. Thu's it is clear that the financial 
liberalization solution is not perfect , and much 
refinement is needed. But the prescriptions for financial 
liberalization have come to be accepted almost as truiSmS 
in the community of policy analysts and academicians. 
However, in the larger world of government policymaker's 
and polit icians , acceptance of financial l iberalization 
has been much Slower, ensnared in great reluctance, and 
met with intense resistance. The experience of the 
Philippines in this regard is instructive. 
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CONSTRAINED LIBERALIZATION: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE IN 
FINANCIAL REFORM 
The Philippines initiated its efforts of financial 
liberalization as early as the late 1970s. A review 
initiated by the government itself into the repeal of the 
Anti-Usury Law had been ongoing since the mid-70s, and had 
cautiously recommended a gradual program to partly 
deregulate interest rates on loans. Implementation of 
deregulation was accelerated in the 1980-81 period, when 
the monetary authorities were practically forced into the 
liberalization process. At that point the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, flexing their muscles, 
made their loan program for the cash-starved Philippines 
conditional upon the implementation of a package of 
financial reforms. The influence of the* international 
lending agencies, however, paled beside the pressure for 
reform exerted by the perilous condition of the Philippine 
economy i tse l f , as it struggled with 1 lagging food 
production due to drought, the effects of the "oil Shock", 
and a * banking system exposed in crisis : following the 
flight of the "high-kiting" industrialist Dewey Dee 
(Tolentino, 1 986 ) . 
The package of financial sector reforms initiated in 
1980-81 included: (a) the gradual abolition of legal 
ceilings on interest rate's, (b) the reduction of 
specialization among types of banks; (c) an increase in 
the minimum capitalization , and thuis the s i z e , of banks; 
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and (d) movement towards the closure of the allocative , 
low-interest rediscount and seed funding windows made 
available by the government, particularly those at the 
Central Bank of the Philippines (Singson, 1985 ) . 
It is not surprising that the package of reforms 
prescribed for the Philippines contained the classic 
elements of financial l iberal izat ion . The Philippines , 
after a l l , had adopted and even developed innovations for 
the supply-leading "strategy of financial development lock, 
stock and barrel up to the late 70s . The Philippine 
legislature enacted a stringent "Anti-Usury Law" in the 
1930s, which prohibited loan interest rates of over 16% 
per annum. In the early 1950s the government declared a 
"one-town, one-bank" policy, and instituted very liberal 
qualif ication , capitalization and 'supervision criteria for 
setting up Rural Banks. These Rural Banks were also 
provided with generous subsidies , tax exemptions, and low-
interest seed funding and rediscounting f a c i l i t i e s . The 
country also built up numerous specialized , targeted 
lending programs funded out of public funds and 
borrowings. There were over 50 such programs by the mid-
1980s. 
The Philippine government did implement the financial 
liberalization program. The Anti-Usury Law was repealed 
in the late 1970s . Interest rates on both- loans and 
deposits have been fully mar ke t-de term irred* since late 
1985. Only about half of the specialized lending programs 
remain, and these are mostly those that operate at close 
to market rates and are le33 targeted than those closed. 
Many of the special privileges and subsidies enjoyed by 
the Rural Banks have been withdrawn, and the "one-town, 
one-bank" policy is no longer followed. An extensive 
program to rehabilitate the Rural Banking SyStem is now 
being implemented, and it is expected that the Rural Bank's 
will emerge from the process as a smaller, but Stronger 
and more independent Set of banks with a comparative 
advantage in lending to agriculture, particularly to the 
small farmers (Dominguez, 1988 ) . 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE PROSPECTS 
Do all the changes described above imply that the 
Philippine financial system has been liberalized? 
At best , the Philippine record at l iberalization is 
mixed. In spite of intense public resistance, the most 
obvious repressive factor - the interest rate structure 
has generally been market-oriented since late 1985. 
Progress haS been made toward minimizing the special , 
privileged lending and rediscount windows of the 
government and the Central Bank. Specialization among the 
different types of banks has been slightly reduced. The 
Central Bank is now actively Shifting away from the role 
of development banker to that of the steward of 
macroeconomic stability and monetary management. 
In spite of the progress that has been made, there 
s t i l l remain a number of constraints to true financial 
l iberal ization . The government has not made any progress 
in repealing Presidential Decree 717 - the Agri-agra law, 
which mandates that bank's allocate at least twenty-five 
percent of their loan portfolios to agricultural projects 
and the beneficiaries of agrarian reform (Cafieda, 1 9 8 8 ) . 
There is also a law that requires that at least seventy-
five percent of the deposits generated in a given 
geographical region be loaned out in that same region. 
Although the intent of these quota's may be laudable, the 
actual effects are contrary to the objective. when the 
quotas are effectively enforced, loans are forced toward 
project's which are normally rejected by the banking 
System. Bankers face greater risks , incur greater levels 
of default , and the costs of Such risk and default are 
borne by society as a whole, further constricting the 
availability of credit (ACPC, 1988 ) . 
The experience of the Philippines with quota's has 
Shown that banking system has been able to evade the 
requirements. The actual proportion of agricultural loans 
in the Philippine financial System's portfolio has 
averaged only ten percent over the paS t two decades 
(Tolentino, 1988) . Banks routinely generate most of their 
deposit holdings in the rural areas, lend in the Manila 
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area, but book or record some of the loan's in the accounts 
of their provincial branches (Blanco and MQyer, 1988 ) . 
Taxation. 
The adverse effects of tax measures And policies on 
the financial market also need to be considered. The 
Philippine government currently taxes ldans, and also 
collects a final withholding tax on interest income earned 
on time and savings deposits. Undoubtedly, these tax 
measures', aside from shifting the task of tax collection 
to the bank's, and, inappropriately, away from the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue also dampens the provision of loans 
and the incentives to save (Llanto, 1 9 8 8 ) . In an era when 
interest rates on savings deposits are bel6w the inflation 
rate's of eight to ten percent per annum, the real deposit 
rate is negative, and is further eroded by taxation. 
Reserve_ Reguiremen ts. 
A further constraint to liberalization is the high 
reserve requirement of the Central Bank, which is 
currently a twenty-one percent on most categories of 
deposits. Such high reserve requirements effectively tie 
up a large proportion of potentially loanable funds and 
cause the banks to incur opportunity losses. Funds tied 
up in reserves also hamper the development and growth of 
the capital market, thus constraining long-term finance 
which can change the term structure of the portfolio of 
the Philippine financial system (McKinnon, 1 9 8 8 ) . Fully 
ninety-five percent of the system's loan asset's are short-
term (Tolentino, 1 9 8 6 ) . In an economy that has to focus 
on long-gestating agricultural projects to get development 
moving, a mismatch between credit terms and project 
characteristics can.be fatal . 
The_Reform^of Regulation. 
The general experience with financial liberalization 
has shown that the liberalization process is multifaceted. 
When the rules causing financial repression are reformed, 
the administrative and regulatory structure's which 
implemented the oppressive rules also need to be reformed. 
The Phil ippine 's reform experience has left in its wake a 
regulatory structure which is not compatible with private-
sector ownership and management and minimum government 
intervention in business and enterprise. For instance, 
the fact that the government contributed most of the 
liquidity used for lending by the Rural Banks induced 
regulations whereby the government effectively ran the 
Rural Banks through detailed rules governing almost all 
aspects of bank operations and decision-making. Thus an 
extensive review of the regulatory 'structure is required 
to determine those regulations which continue to repress 
the financial system, since liberalization changes the 
premises upon which regulatory activities are founded. 
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ADJUSTING TOWARD FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: TRANSITION 
MECHANISMS 
The process of financial l iberalization now unfolding 
in the Philippines has become a much more complex 
undertaking since it iS currently taking place in a larger 
context of political and economic renewal and reform. 
Adjus ting_ jto_ Representative Democracy. 
The Philippines iS in the midst of readjusting to the 
workings of democracy. In the past two years, the 
Filipinos went through a Series of popular, free 
elections. The new constitution waS overwhelmingly 
rat i f ied . A bicameral CongreSs, now operating after 
nearly Sixteen y^ars of power and policy concentrated in 
the executive branch of government, is now rediscovering 
its power's and flexing its muscleS. Thus the special and 
regional interests of the Senators and Representatives 
have come into play. It iS no surprise that a most 
attractive area of proposed legislation iS the provision 
of loans under special terms to the representatives' 
constituencies. There i s , therefore, a clear danger in 
this situation that the economy will Slide back into a 
financially-repressed State. There are at least three 
dozen draft lawS now being considered, the great majority 
of which, if passed into law, will again create a 
repressed financial market. Thus major efforts need to 
be undertaken immediately to heed the lessons of the past, 
disseminate these widely, and to specifically educate the 
policymakers about the results of that experience. 
Transition_ Mechanisms. 
The process of full political and economic 
liberalization w i l l , of course, take time. The 
undesirable effect's of financial repression will linger 
through the adjustment period. In an era of political 
freedom, pressures will build up on government as 
interest groups preSs for specialized lending privilege's 
perceived as being useful measures to attenuate poverty. 
Thi's may lead into a renewed cycle of financial 
repression. 
The fact that the process of financial 
l iberalization , particularly its management and phasing, 
is not yet very well understood increase's the danger of a 
fallback into repression. The unfortunate recent 
experiences of Chile , Brazil and Peru provide ample 
evidence that the reform process is no picnic . These 
South American countries plunged dramatically, over an 
abbreviated period, into financial l iberalization . The 
result thus far has been a painful withdrawal into a more 
repressed state (Connoly and Gonzalez-Vega, 1 986 ) . Even 
the foremost author of financial l iberal izat ion , Ronald 
McKinnon, upon observing the -South American experience, 
has suggested that governments implementing liberalization 
would be well-advised to carefully establish a gradual 
phaSe-in pattern which would allow both the financial and 
real sectors of the economy to adjust to .the removal of 
the repressive instrument's (McKinnon, 1 9 8 8 ) . 
There "seems to be a case, therefore, for government 
enactment of measure's which will accelerate liberalization 
to mitigate the undesirable effects of repression and to 
reduce the political pressures lobbying for new repressive 
measures. Possible positive mechanisms include: (a) 
loan guarantee and commodity insurance SystemS, (b) seed 
funding f a c i l i t i e s , (c) the development of the so-called 
"non-traditional" financial intermediaries; and f inal ly , 
(d) a renewed and intensified refocussing of public 
investment and attention to the fundamental factor's which 
account for development and growth, such as savings and 
investment. 
Loan Guarantees and_ Cpmmodi tym Insurance . 
Many governments have realized that government 
funding of projects iS inefficient and ineffective , given 
the sheer magnitude of the funds required and the fact 
that government's are poor bankers. Guarantee and crop 
insurance programs are thought to enable governments to 
influence the volume and direction of lending by private 
banks. The comparative advantage of the private banking 
sector in loan appraisal and monitoring is fully 
exploited. Guarantees and insurance programs may also be 
designed to cover only part of the risks involved, ar.d 
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thus scarce governmental resources may be leveraged for1 
greater coverage. 
The Philippines has had a crop insurance system - the 
Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (a government 
corporation) in operation for seven years. Apart from the 
init ial capitalization of the system, the government haS 
found that the system has so far been able to support its 
operations based on it's revenues. The Philippines also 
has a group of guarantee systems - the Industrial 
Guarantee and Loan Fund, the Guarantee Fund for Small and 
Medium Enterprises, the Quedan Guarantee Fund Board, and 
the Philippine Export Loan and Guarantee Corporation. The 
performance of these guarantee agencies has been mixed. 
The most important lesson learned so far is that these 
agencies, in order to be sustainable, must develop Skill's 
in the assessment of the cash flow viabil ity of the 
projects guaranteed. The attention to cash flow, rather 
than collateral is what distinguishes the guarantee 
agencies from banks. When e f fect ive , the guarantee 
agencies are able to facilitate formal lending to that 
segment of projects which are viable yet poorly 
collateralized and therefore non-bankable. 
Seed Funding F a c i l i t i e s . 
Term transformation, or. the process whereby the 
average maturity of the loan portfolio of the banking 
system is lengthened, is a critical indicator of growth in 
developing nations. However, political and economic 
uncertainty constrain the time horizons of bankers. In 
most developing countries there usually are adequate funds 
for short-term lending, but resources for medium and long-
term lending are very scarce. The capital market is also 
thin, and thus the • long-term fund's generated by pension, 
retirement, social security, trust and insurance systems 
do not find their way into long-term loan and equity 
markets. This situation frequently leads governments to 
establish seed funding facil it ies for longer-term 
projects. The basic objective of seed funding is to 
initiate bank involvement in longer-term lending. 
Seed funding programs are familiar interventions by 
government in the Philippines . In fact , the Philippine 
government had as many as fifty such programs at one time. 
These programs exemplified the hallmarks of financial 
repression: targe tted to specific commodities, sector's or 
clientele , and the funds were provided at subsidized, 
below-market rate's. The seed funding fac i l it ies are 
currently in operation. Primarily the Industrial 
Guarantee and Loan Fund, the Agricultural Loan Fund, and 
the Integrated Rural Financing Program are available at 
market interest rate's, only to banks and financial 
institutions which meet rigorous standards of performance. 
Efforts are now being exerted to modify the rules 
sorrounding the operation of the existing: seed funds so 
that these may, in general, be used to f u l f i l l the non-
targeted liquidity requirements of the banks and 
participating financial institutions. 
The^Deve j-opmen t_ of "Non^ tradi t i o n a l ^ F i n a n c i a l 
Intermediaries. 
In recent years much excitement has been generated by 
discoveries arising from research into Self-help groups, 
cooperatives, pawnshops (ROSCAs) and other informal 
sources of financial services. These informal agents 
often serve as substitutes for the repressed formal 
s e c t o r . . More importantly, the research also indicates 
that the informal Sector also serves as a crit ical 
complement for formal finance. Informal lenders and 
institutions serve markets which the formal Sector cannot 
serve, particularly the rural sector and the poor. 
The development of financial functions in the 
voluntary, Self-help groups also serves to strengthen the 
empowering potential of these institutions . In 
particular , the informal financial groups provide saving's 
faci l it ies which would otherwise be absent in the rural 
area's. These savings mechanisms enable the groups to 
intermediate finance between member's with surplus fund's 
and those with deficit's. The group alSo provides 
opportunities for the poor to pool their individually-
meagre resources into volumes large enough to finance 
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lumpy investments. 
The experience of cooperative banking in many 
countries - the Rabobank system of the Netherlands, the 
Raffeissen Bank of Germany, the French Credit Agricole, 
and the Japanese and Korean examples - have inspired many 
governments in developing nations to establish Similar 
systems. The experience with theSe transplanted 
structures, however, has generally been disappointing. 
Recent research Shows that while the physical 5truetureS 
of the cooperative financial intermediaries are easily 
copied, the evolution and historical development of such 
are not as easily transferred (Llanto, e t . 1 9 8 7 ) . 
The e f f ic ient and viable operation of a cooperative bank 
is more learned than legislated . Private sector 
domination and responsiveness to the demand and supply 
conditions in the market is crit ical for continued 
v iabi l ity . Government Subsidies cannot be provided 
endlessly. Thus care and deliberation is required to see 
to the success of cooperative systems and banking. 
Re focus's ing_ on_, the_ Fun dame n talg..pf ..Dgyg j-Qpfren t. 
One of the most basic concepts that must be 
remembered in considering the relationship between 
financial policy and development iS that "subsidized 
credit will not make an unprofitable project prof itable " , 
(Adams, 1 987 ) . Research and experience 3howS that the 
critical elements of agricultural productivity and 
profitabil ity , ranked in order of Significance , are rural 
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infrastructure like irrigation , roads, bridges and 
electrif ication , research and extension (Evenson, 1986 ) ; 
and rational agricultural price policies (Timmer, 1986; 
David, 1 987 ) . Forcing the financial system to lend for 
"development" purposes may be likened to pushing a string . 
Yet when the object of lending and investment is indeed 
profitable , finance will flow toward it naturally, with 
l ittle or no inducement from government (Tolentino, 1 987 ) . 
CONCLUSION 
The adequate availability of finance is a must for 
growth. Yet the means to enhance the flow of finance is 
unclear. We have made a brief review of the good 
intentions which brought many countries the world over 
into financial repression. Many of the premise's upon 
which the regulation of financial markets rest are flawed, 
and thus the regulation's are ineffective , or worse, 
produce unintended and undesired results . Programs of 
financial liberalization have been attempted in some 
countries, some with success and the others not achieving 
any alleviation of financial repression. The leSSon's of 
experience now tell us-that while financial l iberalization 
iS a worthy undertaking, it ought to be implemented with 
care and deliberation. Moreover, a set of transition 
measures may be necessary to assist in the adjustment 
process from the repressed to the l iberalized state . Such 
transition measures include guarantees, insurance, seed 
funding, non-traditional credit institutions and a new 
emphasis on the fundamentals of development. 
It also Seems clear that political will is necessary 
to successfully carry out the process of financial 
l iberalization So that growth and development may be 
accelerated and sustained. Furthermore, the 
liberalization process involves elements which lie 
outside the direct purview of the financial SyStem. 
Political and economic stability is also c r i t i c a l , since 
depositor and banker confidence through a forseeably 
positive horizon must be sustained in ordter that deposits 
are generated and maintained, makitig longer-term 
investments and loanS feasible . Attention to basic 
development imperatives is also a must. Agrarian reform 
which provides the foundations for a more equitable 
sharing of income and wealth, and the reteulting greater 
bankability of beneficiaries possessing titles to their 
lands, is necessary. The basic infrastructure of 
development and this fundamental services ifor agricultural 
productivity must be in place. These are the elements 
which truly make the clients of the banking system 
creditworthy, and their projects l i a b l e . The bottom line 
is therefore the need to focus on the> elements which 
create a resurgent, dynamic economy, Thiis, coupled with 
financial l iberal izat ion , should result in a positively-
responding financial sector in service of growth and 
development. 
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